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From the mid 1990s there has been a dramatic rise in women’s parliamentary 
representation across a range of countries, driven primarily by the adoption of quotas.  
One of the noticeable features of this development is the number of democratising, 
post-crisis and developing countries that now have a percentage of women in 
parliament that is at, or above, European averages.  This trend is graphically 
illustrated by the ousting of Sweden from the top of the international league table 
(compiled by the Inter-parliamentary Union) by Rwanda where women now make up 
48.8% of the national parliament since the election in 2003.  Between 2000 and 2003 
the Americas, Europe (excluding the Nordic countries), Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Arab states all experienced a rise in women’s participation in parliaments between 2% 
and 2.5%, while the Nordic Countries, Asia and the Pacific region remained static.  
This modest overall rise masks some significant increases; for example in Costa Rica 
the number of women in parliament rose from 19.3 % in 2000 to 35.1% in 2003, 
while in Bulgaria in the same period the rise was from 10.8% to 26.2%.  Within the 
European Union some states that had previously a poor record of women’s public 
representation have dramatically increased the number of women in their national 
parliaments.  Belgium for example has increased the percentage of women members 
of parliament from 12% in 1995 to 35.3% in 2003.  Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 
figures show that 24% of states now have parliaments whose membership is at least 
20% female, compared to 16% in January 2000, while the proportion of states where 
women make up less than 10% of parliament has fallen from 46% of the total in 2000 
to 35% of the total in 2003.   
 
On a global scale it appears that something significant is happening to women’s 
political representation that cannot be fully explained by reference to the internal 
dynamics of any individual state or region.  Illustrative of the unique character of this 
development is UNIFEM’s celebration of the increased use of quotas in developing 
countries and the resulting rise of women in politics as ‘the only indicator not affected 
by national poverty’ (UNIFEM, 2002).  In Sub Saharan Africa, one of the worlds 
poorest regions 13 out of 39 states now have parliaments that are at least 15% women, 
the figure that has been considered a significant minority.  This statement invites the 
question - what makes the number of women in parliaments such a unique indicator?  
The answer is suggested by the caution with which the rising numbers of African 
women in parliaments has been greeted in some quarters (DAWN, 2000) and this 
criticism has been part of a more general critique of the process of democratisation in 
Africa.  This criticism has centred on the democratisation process as a western 
project, using a western model, concerned with procedural democracy and ignoring 
the economic and social conditions considered necessary for democracy to effectively 
function (Kasfir, 1998).  Hauser (1999: 621 and 641) points to democratisation as a 
major aim of donors and to the relative weakness of African countries to resist the 
pressures for an elite driven, ‘top down’ democracy.  While Salo and Lewis (2002) 
argue that ‘powerful incentives from donor bodies like the World Band and the IMF’ 
to adopt gender equality policies means that ‘enormous’ attention is ‘paid to window 
dressing’ and ‘almost no attention is given to actual changes.  
 
This paper uses an ideational model of gender regime change to explain the rise in the 
number of women in parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the embedding 
of ideas on gender equality, and specifically the use of quotas, in key international 
institutions.  Gender quotas have been institutionalised in the good governance 
program that receives Northern donor support and have therefore have become part of 
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the reconstruction of African states from the early 1990s.  Further it is argued that the 
embedding of these ideas and their incorporation into the democratisation process 
does not mark a significant revision of the global gender regime but is contained 
within the ideological framework provided by second wave feminism.  In arguing this 
perspective it is not being suggested either that this western orientated set of ideas on 
gender equality should provide a blue print for women’s movements in Africa or that 
African women do not have agency.  It is also leaves open the question of what 
impact an increasing number of women parliamentarians will have in the long run.  
The paper argues that understanding the international rise in the number of women in 
parliament in this way helps identify the limits of this process as an expression of 
gender equality.  It also points to the conflicts between elite and non-elite groups on 
issues of gender that are likely to emerge as a result of these changes.   
 
The paper will first discuss how an ideational model can be used to explain gender 
regime change using the well-documented process of regime change that took place in 
Europe from the late 1960s to the early 1970s.  It will do this because it is argued here 
that it is the ideas (and policy strategies) that were contained in this process that have 
been incorporated into the agendas of international organisations and that these ideas 
on equality are now shaping the model of democracy that is being exported to Africa.  
It will then examine the pattern of change in parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
arguing that there is evidence to suggest that the degree of influence of external 
factors and of donors is a key explanatory factor in determining the percentage of 
women in parliament. 
 
Ideational Change 
 
Offen (2000:393) stated, in her conclusion to a history of European Feminism, that 
‘surveying the broad sweep of European history and geography of feminist eruptions 
between 1700 and 1950, it seem clear that the impulse to reposition women under 
male control has recurred repeatedly and each time has been more vigorously 
challenged’.  She concluded that the history of feminist protest contained ‘recurrent 
patterns that we are only beginning to understand’.  Assuming that the recent global 
changes in the percentages of women in parliaments is part of this recurrent process of 
change a historic institutional approach, using an ideational model provides a 
framework in which this can be discussed.  ‘Ideational’ literature has usefully 
contributed to understanding the nature of political institutions – in that it explains 
both why such institutions tend to produce continuity and also why the process of 
change takes the form it does.  This is especially true when the domestic policy 
reform appears to be part of an international trend as is the adoption of quotas.  Under 
these circumstances an ideational model makes it possible to link the political 
conditions of individual states to an international discourse that is shaping policy 
outcomes (Hall 1989; Blyth 2002).   
 
The ‘ideational’ literature explains how ideas, ‘once successfully institutionalised can 
affect policy outcomes’ arguing that once ideas are ‘institutionally embedded, policy 
making becomes possible only in terms of these ideas’ (Blyth, 2001: 4).  This model 
has been applied primarily to major shifts in macro-economic policy and to a lesser 
extent to foreign policy paradigms.  Its key application has been to explain both the 
processes by which Keynesian economics became the dominant foundation of state 
macro economic policy after the Second World War, and the equally dramatic 
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adoption of neo-liberal orthodoxy in the 1980s.  In this way it has described how a set 
of ideas are used to contest an existing frame work of policies and institutions, and 
how after a period of dissent and political regrouping a new policy paradigm emerges 
and creates new institutions or redefines existing ones.  In this context a policy 
paradigm is being defined as ‘a framework of ideas and standards’ that specifies ‘the 
goals of policy’ and the ‘nature of the problems’ that policy in that arena is intended 
to address (Hall, 1993: 279).  The power of a policy paradigm lies in its ability to 
structure the way in which actors ‘see the world and their role within it’ (Hall, 1992: 
92).  The implementation of a policy paradigm generates a set of institutions and 
policy outcomes that flow from the paradigm.  Once such a regime is put in place it 
will structure what actions, and policy, are possible within its context.  Policy outside 
the framework of an institutionalised policy paradigm becomes literally ‘unthinkable’, 
without the ideational basis of the paradigm being restructured (ref).   
 
If a reorientation of a policy paradigm requires a shift in its ideational basis it is 
reasonable to postulate that such a shift would be a significant event, that it would 
meet with institutional resistance as well as resistance from existing vested interests.  
It is likely that change in the state’s gender regime, and the gender paradigm on which 
it is based, because it is so deeply rooted in social relations, would require substantial 
change at the societal level.  As Legro (2000: 424) points out ‘change in societal-level 
beliefs requires ‘collective ideation’, and this formation of group ideas implies a need 
for co-ordinated and/or collective action to facilitate change’.  On this basis Legro  
(2000: 424) suggests a model of ideational change involving two idealised stages.  
The first stage involves the ‘collapse’ of the existing ‘consensus’ where significant 
actors are able to agree that ‘the old orthodoxy is inadequate and should be replaced’.  
The second phase is the ‘consolidation of a new ideational structure’, which requires 
the existence of ‘a viable oppositional idea, the prescriptions of which correlate with 
socially desired results’  (Legro, 2000: 426).  The process by which a coherent 
‘oppositional idea’ emerges is likely to be a complex political battle involving an 
array of alternative ideas, interest groupings and political structures. 
 
Arguing from a similar perspective Blyth suggests that ideas give shape to group 
interests and structure the institutions of the state and also its policy regime – existing 
political institutions are inevitably the result of past ideas that shaped the political 
system (1997: 233).  He states that ‘this framework provides a fresh approach to 
understanding both the limits of state activity and how those limits can be challenged 
over time’ (1997: 240).  Blyth's model defines the life cycle of a structuring set of 
ideas suggesting three distinct phases.  In the initial discursive phase definitions are 
contested and the political space is opened up in which new ideas can emerge.  During 
this stage, ideas ‘alter individual and collective perceptions of interest’, that is they 
‘change agents’ definition of which actions and policies are in their self-interest and 
thus alter their basis of identity and action’.  This is followed by an instrumentalist 
phase in which ‘ideas are co-opted by agents attempting to ‘redefine’ boundaries and 
‘reform institutional arrangements’.  It also ‘facilitates new patterns of collective 
action’.  The Third phase, the reconstitutive phase, is where ‘new ideas become 
embedded (or fail to become embedded) in the institutions of the state’ (1997: 234).  
As ideas are not static concepts but are developed and changed, as they are both used 
and contested, the way in which ideas become institutionally embedded is likely to be 
in a form that is the outcome of a negotiated bargain between the various actors in the 
policy process.  The ‘social bargain’ between the state, labour and capital described 
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by Blyth can be equated with a ‘gender contract’ or ‘gender bargain’ formulated 
between the state, labour, capital, and women’s organisations.   
 
A key difference between the models suggested by Legro and Blyth, is that according 
to Blyth, Legro’s period of regime ‘collapse’ can be seen as a two-stage process.  The 
first stage of regime collapse is dominated by an initial critique of the existing 
paradigm and the opening up of political space, allowing new forms of political 
activity to emerge and new ideas to be introduced.  It is also probable during this 
phase that the interaction and power hierarchy between existing interest groups will 
be altered.  In the second stage of regime collapse Blyth implies that the new ideas 
being employed to undermine the existing regime have become more coherent and 
have also resulted in new forms of collective action.  It is also implied that in the 
debate on the redefinition of the existing regime both those groupings who seek to 
change that regime, and the vested interests who oppose those changes, are all forced, 
to a lesser or greater extent, to address the ‘problems’ that have led to regime collapse 
in terms of the new ideational framework.    
 
It is for this reason that ‘ideas’ have a problematic conceptual relationship with 
‘interests’.  To what extent can a regime change be perceived as a result of a contest 
between various social interests rather than because of the impact of ‘new’ ideas?  As 
Blyth (1997: 231) suggests, ‘ideas are more than post-hoc rationalisations for existing 
interests’.  It can be argued that, like institutions, interests are constructed by ideas 
and that this is the case even when membership of a particular grouping is related to 
actual material conditions such as membership of a trade union or an employer’s 
organisation.  Because of this, interests do not just deploy ideas as ‘weapons’ 
(although they certainly do use them in this way); they are also shaped by them 
(Blyth, 2001:4).  Because of this ‘ideas’ have two other important impacts.  Firstly, 
they can force a reassessment on the part of individuals and groups and may even 
change their perception of their interests.  Secondly, under conditions of regime 
collapse, the emergence of new ideational frameworks will almost invariably result in 
the creation of new interest formations.  
 
‘Ideas’ that shape macro economic policy or a state’s gender regime, replacing an 
existing policy paradigm, may contain novel elements but they will also, in part, be a 
reworking of pre-existing debates.  Many of the intellectual ideas of neo-liberalism 
were not ‘new’ in the sense that they had been formulated in the late 1970s when they 
first began to make a policy impact.  They had an intellectual pedigree going back to 
the post-war critique of Keynesianism and beyond that to the long running debate on 
the economic role of the state and fundamental issues of economic redistribution.  
These ideas were developed and repackaged at the end of the 1970s to meet the 
particular circumstance of that time.  This represented an intellectual advance but it 
was one that also had a long intellectual tradition.   
 
The models presented by Legro and Blyth, and the work of Hall on macro economic 
policy, explain why policy paradigms exhibit a strong tendency towards continuity.  
They also explain the nature of paradigm change as a relatively brief, but strenuous 
period of renegotiation in which both pre-existing and new interest formations are 
engaged.  As the ideational basis of the paradigm is a key determinant of its policy 
output it explains why a policy regime can produce policy changes that were neither 
planned nor desired by the interest coalition that put the policy paradigm in place.  It 
 6
also explains why policy institutions cannot produce outcomes that are outside the 
original ideational structure on which they are constructed.   
 
The Gendered State and Gendered Public Policy Regimes 
 
Bringing together the literature on ideation with the literature on the ‘gendered state’ 
allows a process of ‘gender regime chance’ to be theorised.  Literature from a feminist 
perspective has defined the state and its gender regime as being structured by a gender 
paradigm that reflects social relationships.  For Connell (1990: 523) a state’s gender 
regime inevitably reflects patterns of gender relations in wider society and is the result 
of past social conflicts within society that produced the current dominant pattern of 
relationships.  This is because the state is an entity, which is constituted within gender 
relations, and is the central institutionalisation of gender power (Connell, 1990).  In 
this model the emphasis is on the relationship of social relations to the form of the 
state, but it does contain the concept of a set of ‘ideas’ on gender shaping the state and 
its policy output.  Again linking the form of the state to social relations Hirdman, 
(cited in Duncan, 1994: 1186-8) describes society as being based on a  ‘gender 
contract’.  The ‘gender contract’, drawing on social contract theory, is the implicit 
agreement between the sexes that sets out the rules that determine gender behaviour 
and assigns men and women their different roles.  The state’s policy output reflects 
and simultaneously reinforces the embedded gender contract (Gottfried, 2000).  This 
is echoed by Barriteau (1998: 188 & 191) who describes a ‘gender system’ as ‘a 
network of power relations’ based on ‘complex systems of personal and social 
relations, through which women and men are socially created and maintained, and 
through which they gain access to, or are allocated, status, power and material 
resources’.  Again Barriteau implicitly envisages the state, as playing a key role in the 
‘maintenance’ and ‘distribution’ aspects of this embedded contract.  Viewing the state 
as gendered in this way allows an analysis of dynamic change in the state’s concept of 
male and female, and in the gendered relationship that underpins all social interaction 
and social structures (Marshall, 1994: 114).   
 
A missing aspect of this conceptualisation of the state as gendered is a mechanism for 
political policy regime renegotiation other than that reflecting social change and 
changing social structures. This is important because social change does not produce a 
change in the gender regime unless it is accompanied by a political process aimed as 
redefining gender issues and changing policy outcomes.  So although this writing on 
gender and the state allows for ‘agency’ to change the gender regime it does not 
theorise the process by which change happens. An ideational model can describe the 
process by which a change in the gender regime occurs that is compatible with the 
main trends of feminist writing on the gendered nature of the state. 
 
The last major change in the gender regime of European democracies occurred from 
the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, and is associated with ‘second wave feminism’.  
During this relatively short period there was a significant shift in the gendered basis of 
public policy to the extent that looking back to the early 1960s from the vantage point 
of ‘post-second wave feminist’ society, there is a clear break between the gender 
policy paradigm of that period and that which existed by the end of the 1970s 
(Connolly, 2003).  The nature and timing of the pattern of gender regime change in 
Western European states followed a similar pattern of policy reform and furthermore 
that process of reform was preceded by an even stronger symmetry of discourse 
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across those states.1  A brief sketch of the process of gender paradigm change 
associated with second wave feminism, using an ideational framework describes a 
two stage process of regime collapse followed by a process of regime reconstitution 
and consolidation.  In the early stages of regime collapse the ideation basis of the 
existing gender regime is critiqued as inadequate and women’s groups (many pre-war 
in their origins) experience an opening up of political space and began to lobby for 
improvements in women’s legal status (Kaplan, 1992; Skjeie, 1991: 92; Galligan, 
1998:48).  In the later stage of regime collapse the critique is intensified and ‘new’ 
ideas arising from second wave feminism, and the broader context of political 
critique, are deployed.  The gender regime is then reconstituted through a process of 
contested negotiation by the state, existing interest groupings, and the new interest 
groups that have been formed as a result of the ideational shift.   
 
The process of gender regime collapse was part of the crisis in the ‘post-war 
settlement’ that developed in the 1960s and expressed women’s dissatisfaction with 
their place in that social bargain.  In the aftermath of the war European states pursued 
a greatly expanded state role in economic development and social provision while re-
establishing pre-war gender norms, negating the impact of women’s war time 
experience as workers, members of liberation movements and as heads of households.  
The ideas on which this gender paradigm was based still drew on the last major period 
of renegotiation of the gender bargain – that associated with first wave feminism.  
Many of the active women’s organisations in this period consciously traced their roots 
to the early decades of the twentieth century. 
 
The critique of the post war bargain in the 1960s was characterised by the breakdown 
of authority, including political hierarchies, growing sexual permissiveness and the 
freeing up of social roles.  These events were motivated by new ideas about the 
relationship of the individual to society and to the state.  Once the ideas of individual 
rights and equal citizenship became collective ideas, applied to other aspects of state 
policy, they were also used to undermine the hierarchical family based on male 
authority, women’s inequality before the law and women’s exclusion from many 
aspects of the public sphere.  The questioning of established social roles and sexual 
relationships permitted by the freeing of sexuality from marriage and a focus on 
individual freedom and fulfilment provided the ideational framework for women to 
question gender relationships at their most fundamental and personal level.  Most 
importantly it also allowed them to make the link between the inequality in personal 
relationships between the sexes and the inequality in the structures of society, 
economy and state (Barrett, 1980; Pateman, 1988). 
 
By the early 1970s the totality of European states’ gender regimes were being 
effectively criticised from these two perspectives: equal rights/equal citizenship and 
personal autonomy.  The equal rights perspective - one which was shared by long 
established women’s organisations and the new ‘women’s movement’, was a 
particularly strong structuring idea.  This was because equality of rights and 
opportunities was becoming the basis for the reform of western political systems and 
women were seeking to have this dominant idea applied to issues of gender.  The 
second critical perspective, that of personal autonomy was linked to the strengthened 
idea of the individual in western society.  This idea encapsulated a number of issues 
                                                 
1 For example see Kaplan’s (1992) account of West European Feminism. 
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including sexual liberation and the disintegration of many aspects of the traditional 
family.  It was used by the women’s movement to promote the idea of sexual 
autonomy for women and to critique the dominant-subordinate nature of the most 
intimate male-female relationships.  As a result of this critical engagement the 
legislative reconstitution of state gender regimes occurred in four key areas: 
employment law; social welfare provision; issues of sexual morality; and fertility 
control, including abortion. 
 
This reconstitution of gender regimes meant that for the majority of European states 
there was substantial reform in the area of family law, in measures to promote the idea 
of equality in employment law, on fertility control and some measures to protect 
women and children from violence and abuse.  These reforms were based on ideas of 
legal and procedural equality, using a male model of citizenship that was modified by 
state financial support and protection for women, primarily in their role as mothers.  
Once institutionalised these ideas continued to provide a framework for incremental 
reform in the following decades.  However this framework of reform did not lead to 
an incremental increase in women’s public representation, based on their rising 
economic and social status as many had anticipated it would and as the ideas of 
equality instituted into the bargain seemed to promise.  For women activists this on 
going failure of women to break into public decision making in significant numbers 
has been a major issue on which they continue to campaigned and strategise.   It was 
not until the 1990s that women made significant gains in terms of their numbers in 
parliament in a variety of national settings primarily because of the adoption of 
specific strategies aimed at increasing their representation including the use of quotas 
(Dahlerup, 1998, Ross 2002).    
 
Framing an analysis of states’ gender regimes in an ideational model suggests regime 
change is episodic and happens as a result of a period of intense political struggle over 
new definitions of problems and new solutions.  If it is accepted that a gender policy 
paradigm, once established, continues to exert a strong influence over political 
institutions and policy formation, the explosion of second wave feminism becomes 
understandable as the expression of major societal force necessary to break down a 
long established regime.  Similarly the regime put in place in the 1970s has also 
proved durable and following the initial wave of reform, changes have been 
incremental and within its ideational paradigm.  The reforms that have taken place 
within this paradigm have in many case followed a process of ‘norm generation’2 that 
has firmly embedded them in the ideology and technical policy tools of international 
institutions and also made it easier for individual states to justify their adoption. 
 
 
Women in Parliaments in Sub Saharan Africa  
 
With the ending of the cold war northern donor states were able to take a new 
approach to Sub Saharan Africa.  This included an acceptance that economic 
development required a competent stable state and the belief that political crisis in 
Africa was in part fuelled by opposition to unrepresentative repressive states.  The 
institutions of international governance (notably the World Bank and the IMF) 
internalised the idea that democracy was a prerequisite for economic development.  
                                                 
2 See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 893) for a discussion of norm generation and the relationship between domestic and 
international norms. 
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Northern donors and international institutions adopted a narrow procedural model of 
democracy that focused on elections and administrative issues.  The blue print they 
used is described by Crawford as ‘a democratic pyramid’ where an ideal of a 
democratic society rests on three pillars – free and fair elections; civil and political 
rights; and open and accountable government (Crawford, 2001: 18).  In the early 
years of the 1990s Africa received a significant injection of aid aimed at promoting a 
transition to democracy based on this model in the belief that this form of 
democratisation would also secure a stable market-led path to development.   
 
The blueprint of democracy that was being used by donors and international 
institutions alike had been arrived at through a process which saw a set of explicit and 
narrow ideas on what constituted democracy becoming accepted and written into the 
policy documents and procedures of national development agencies and also those of 
other key international actors and institutions.  One of the ideas that were formally 
institutionalised in this model of democracy was that of procedural gender equality.  
The idea that gender equality should be ‘mainstreamed’ in all policy areas had proved 
a successful one – in that it had received wide spread support in national and 
international policy processes. However its adoption did not result in concrete policy 
outcomes that improved the status and welfare of women and such bureaucratic 
processes were widely perceived to be ‘window dressing’ measures.  The idea of 
gender mainstreaming impacted on the area of political representation and policies to 
promote democracy and good governance came to include measures to achieve 
gender equality.  Equality in this case was defined as meaning equal access to the 
political process and gender equal outcomes in terms of political representation.  
Gender quotas, both legislative and political party quotas had proven successful in a 
number of developed states and had been advocated by feminists for many years as a 
way of breaking down barriers to women’s political participation.  In the model of 
democracy adopted by development agencies and international institutions, gender 
equality in terms of political representation became a goal, and gender quotas the way 
to achieve that goal3.   
 
In terms of the ideational model discussed earlier, feminist activism was successful in 
having the ideas of political ‘quotas’ instituted in this way because the ‘aim’ of 
political equality was part of the gender regime that had been embedded in 
institutional form, from the end of the 1970s in industrialised countries and it was also 
consistent with ideas on democracy that became hegemonic in the post-cold war 
world.  As such, the use of quotas did not represent a new development in political 
thinking but the completion of an aspect of the agenda of second wave feminism that 
had been long campaigned for.  This institutionalising of the idea of quotas would not 
have had as strong an effect without the comparative weakness of the developing 
states, especially those in Sub Saharan Africa, compared to the collective influence of 
Northern Donor agencies and the international institutions.  The international 
institutions – because they are more firmly tied to agreed, strong, international norms 
than are individual states - have played a key role in spreading the use of gender 
quotas.  The International IDEA, for example, has made gender equality and the 
advocacy of quotas an integral part of the election and political support it gives. 
 
                                                 
3 See Tripp (2003) for a comment on the redirection of donor spending and the impact of international conferences. 
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This model of democracy, and the assumptions underlying it, has been criticised by a 
variety of actors, including initially the UNDP who were unhappy with both the ‘one 
size fits all’ approach and the implicit high level of external direction.  They argued 
that democracy should be ‘home grown’.  Subsequently fears have been expressed 
that the model of democracy being advocated produces a shallow form of democracy, 
that is essentially procedural with weak societal roots and which ignores issues of 
social and economic rights that many believe essential to a democratic state.  Doubts 
have also been expressed about the beneficial impact on wider issues of women’s 
rights and welfare of the increase in the number of women in parliaments.  As table 
one demonstrates, in terms of increasing the numbers of women in national 
parliaments, this policy has been remarkably successful since its inception in the early 
1990s.  Of the 39 Sub-Saharan African states listed for which figures exist, 14 have 
parliaments with a higher female participation than the USA, whose current figure 
stands at 14.3%.  It is also notable that of those 14 states the majority are post conflict 
societies that have had a high level of external actor engagement in the process of 
reconstruction.   
 
These issues can be further explored by examining a sample of seven countries in 
more detail4.  South Africa, Mozambique, and Namibia all have parliaments that are 
over 25% female, Uganda stands at 24.7%.  Kenya, Ghana, and Cameroon have 
parliaments that have a female membership of less than 10%.  The first three 
countries have all come through a recent period of crisis that has resulted in a high 
level of involvement of external actors, while Uganda after the legacy of the Amin 
dictatorship, has actively embraced external actor engagement in its development 
process (particularly through the adoption of IMF/WB programmes).  The remaining 
three countries have been relatively stable.  The first four countries, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Namibia and Uganda were amongst the top twenty recipients of 
‘political aid’ in the world during the first half of the 1990s - South Africa and 
Mozambique where clearly in first and second place respectively in this league table 
(Crawford, 2001: 114).  Commenting on the position of South Africa, Hearns (2000) 
described aid to that country as ‘very much a case of democratic assistance’ to the 
extent that it provides the best case study of ‘contemporary foreign intervention in a 
country’s democratisation process’.  Kenya, Ghana and Cameroon did not feature in 
the top 20 on this list.  For all seven countries there appears to be a link between 
levels of aid and women in parliament although this relationship is not a simple one.  
Political aid flows for the purposes of assisting administration and the election process 
tend to ‘spike’ in the two-year lead-in period prior to an election.  Aid flows that are 
directed at ‘women in development’ (WID) projects also follow this pattern. WID aid 
flows are very small compared to other aid flows.  The fact they also show a tendency 
to peak prior to elections would seem to indicate that a significant proportion of this 
albeit small amount of aid for women’s projects is designed to assist women in the 
political process.  In support of this Tripp (2003: 239) points to a growing tendency 
for donors to promote women’s political participation, including the funding of 
organisations involved in advocacy around equality clauses in constitutions, and other 
projects that are described as non-partisan issues. 
 
The three post conflict societies in this sample South Africa, Mozambique and 
Namibia all had strong women’s movements associated with the parties who came to 
                                                 
4 These countries are selected as representative of both those with high numbers of women in parliament and those with fairly 
low numbers. 
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power after the reconstitution of the state.  Here the aims of external donors coincided 
with the aims of internal organised women’s groups, however even under these 
circumstances doubts have been expressed about the beneficial impact of this external 
engagement.  Under donor pressure quotas for women were conceded without a 
struggle. In Mozambique the elections are seen to have been strongly affected by 
‘external global forces’ (Jacobson, 1994: 10) and have been ‘evoked as evidence that 
the UN can manage a political transition which does not collapse into chaos’ 
(Harrison, 1996).  One result of the adoption of quotas with minimal debate was that 
women’s rights issues and the question of gender equality were not political issues in 
the elections that followed (Jacobson, 1996).  Neither does the significant number of 
women in parliament in some states appear to have made a commensurate impact on 
policy output and implementation.  Goetz (1998) who supports what she refers to as 
this ‘bureaucratic form of representation for the gender equality interest in policy 
making’ in Uganda and South Africa, still describes the results as ‘ambivalent’, in that 
they raise awareness and produce rhetorical commitments to women’s rights but do 
not bring substantive change.  Similarly Hearns (2000) describes external support for 
procedural democracy in South Africa as aimed at not ‘reconstructing the social order 
but about effective system maintenance’.  It has also been claimed that the active 
women’s organisations that existed during the conflict and immediate post-conflict 
phases have been weakened and have been unable to sustain their momentum after the 
institutionalisation of democracy (Connell, 1998).  
 
Ghana and Cameroon, apart from an aid spike at the beginning of the 1990s 
associated with the initial democratisation process, have received virtually no WID 
aid during the 1990s.  In Ghana, the level of women in parliament has remained 
relatively static, at 8% in 1992, rising to 9% after the 1997 election, and remaining at 
9% in the election held at the end of 2000.  Between 1993 and 2000 WID aid totalled 
only just over a quarter of a million US dollars.  In Cameroon at the beginning of the 
1990s women’s project aid was US$4.5 million approximately over a two year period, 
compared to only a little more than one million for aid for administration and 
elections.  With women only making up 5% of the parliament after the elections in 
1992 women’s aid was virtually non-existent until 1999 when it spiked prior to the 
elections in 2002.  The percentage of women in Cameroon’s parliament remains at 
just under 9%.  Unlike the situation in most African states, total aid flows to Kenya 
declined sharply in the early 1990s, from the relatively high levels of the previous 
decade, as donors became disenchanted with the Moi government.  However within 
this general decline aid flows for administration/elections and for women’s projects 
both show a pattern of peaking prior to elections.  In 1996, women’s aid peaked at the 
comparatively high figure of 7.5 million, with no subsequent rise in the numbers of 
women in parliament, after the 1998 election.  Significantly women’s aid did not peak 
prior to the elections in 2002.  In this case donor funding was focused on the 
opposition – a coalition of anti-government groups - and no pressure was put on the 
opposition coalition to increase its representation of women prior to the election.  The 
donor priority was the defeat of the incumbent government.  The results of the 
election showed a modest increase in the parliamentary representation of women from 
3% to 7%.  In these three countries, because of their comparative stability, donor 
engagement in the internal construction of democracy has been limited, and there has 
been no significant rise in the numbers of women in parliament. 
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Conclusion 
 
The evidence here would suggest that the widespread introduction of quotas and the 
rise in the numbers of women in parliament are not part of a new paradigm, the ideas 
about gender on which the argument for parity politics is grounded fits within the 
existing gender paradigm employed by donors and international institutions.  
Supporting this view Dahelerup (1998) argues that the idea of ‘equality of results’ and 
the strategies being adopted have been advocated by feminists ‘in the last few 
decades’.  International institutions have developed a strong discourse on good 
governance (Schraeder, 2002; O’Brien et al, 2002) and the foreign aid policies of 
Northern ‘donor’ governments since the early 1990s have linked ‘development 
assistance to the promotion of human rights and democracy and good governance in 
Southern ‘recipient’ countries’ and this has included gender equality (Crawford, 2001: 
1-17).   The developments in Sub Saharan Africa illustrate the power of policy norms 
once they have become institutionally embedded.  It is still too early for the impact of 
the significant rise in the number of women in parliaments to be clear.  This is true of 
Africa as well as other regions.  However there are potential problems in such an elite 
and external actor driven project.  A primary problem is that the focus on procedural 
issues will lead it to ignore crucial social and economic ones that effect the lives of 
the majority of women.  Major sources of gender inequality such as traditional law 
and land ownership patterns have proved difficult to deal with because to do so would 
require a level of societal consensus and political will that as yet does not exist.  The 
political climate of the 1990s made it possible for international women’s networks to 
effectively push for the introduction of quotas and such reforms are attractive to 
political elites as a way of increasing the legitimacy of the political system.  However 
without a fundamental shift in political practice greater parity in political 
representation does not guarantee increased equality in other spheres.  Although 
women’s greater political representation can be critiqued as window dressing for the 
benefit of donors, it does give women a new voice, and once quotas have been put in 
place their ultimate impact is an unknown factor.  These changes are likely to increase 
the pressures on the existing paradigm because increasing the number of women in 
parliaments without an accompanying ideational change will not resolve fundamental 
criticisms of the political system, including its gender contract.  The reforms will not 
solve the developmental problems, the lack of substantive democracy in many African 
states, or improve women’s status – but their failure to do these things may increase 
the pressure for more substantial reform including a  change in gender relations. 
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Table 1. 
 
Country % 
Women 
in Parl 
Government 
Type 
Electoral 
System 
System 
Type 
Gender 
Quotas 
Pop^n GDP 
per 
Capita
Rwanda 48.8 republic; 
presidential, 
multiparty system  
first-past-the-
post 
plurality Legislated - 
26 seats and 
30 % at local 
level 
7,810,056 $1,200 
Mozambique 30 republic  party list proportional Party Quota 
-Frelimo 
30% on lists 
17,479,266 $1,100 
South Africa 29.8 republic  party list proportional Legislated 
Quota - 
Women 
must 
comprise 
50% at local 
level. Also 
ANC party 
quota of 
33.33% 
42,768,678 $10,000 
Seychelles 29.4 republic  parallel: first-
past-the-post 
semi-
proportional 
No 80,469 $7,800 
Namibia 26.4 republic  party list  proportional Legislated 
Quota - 
Women 
must 
comprise 
30% of  
party lists at 
local level 
1,927,447 $6,900 
Uganda 24.7 republic  first-past-the-
post 
 plurality  Legislated - 
56 seats for 
Women 
25,632,794 $1,200 
Eritrea 22 transitional 
government  
party list proportional Legislated - 
30% Seats 
at national 
and local 
assemblies 
4,362,254 $700 
Tanzania 21.4 republic  first-past-the-
post 
plurality Reserved 
Seats - 20% 
at national 
level, 25% at 
local level 
35,922,454 $600 
Guinea 19.3 republic  parallel: first-
past-the-post 
semi-
proportional 
No 9,030,220 $2,100 
Senegal 19.2 republic under 
multiparty 
democratic rule  
parallel: party 
block 
semi-
proportional 
Party Quota 
- 25% 
10,580,307 $1,500 
Burundi 
 
18.4 republic  party list proportional No 6,096,156 $500 
Botswana 17 parliamentary 
republic  
first-past-the-
post 
plurality Party Quota 
- BNF, BCP 
30% on lists 
1,573,267 $8,500 
Angola 15.5 republic, nominally 
a multiparty 
democracy with a 
strong presidential 
system  
party list proportional No 10,766,471 $1,700 
Sierra Leone 14.5 constitutional 
democracy  
party list proportional Party Quota 
- 5 Parties 
30% 
5,732,681 $500 
Gambia 13.2 republic under 
multiparty 
democratic rule  
first-past-the-
post 
plurality No 1,501,050 $1,800 
Zambia 12 Republic  first-past-the-
post 
plurality No 10,307,333 $800 
Burkina Faso 11.7 parliamentary 
republic  
party list  proportional No 13,228,460 $1,100 
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Country % 
Women 
in Parl 
Government 
Type 
Electoral 
System 
System 
Type 
Gender 
Quotas 
Pop^n GDP 
per 
Capita
Lesotho 11.7 parliamentary 
constitutional 
monarchy  
first-past-the-
post 
plurality Party Quota 
- ADEMA 
30% 
1,861,959 $2,700 
Cape Verde 11.1 Republic  party list proportional No 412,137 $1,400 
Djibouti 10.8 Republic  party block plurality Legislated 
Quota - 10% 
National Parl 
for Women 
457,130 $1,300 
Swaziland 10.8 Monarchy  first-past-the-
post  
plurality  No 1,161,219 $4,800 
Mali 10.2 Republic  two-round 
system 
majority No 11,626,219 $900 
Zimbabwe 10 Parliamentary 
democracy   
first-past-the-
post 
plurality No 12,576,742 $2,100 
Sudan 9.7 authoritarian regime 
- ruling military junta 
took power in 1989; 
government is run 
by an alliance of the 
military and the 
National Congress 
Party (NCP) 
 
first-past-the-
post  
plurality Legislated - 
35 seats 
reserved for 
women 
38,114,160 $1,400 
Malawi 9.3 Multiparty 
democracy  
first-past-the-
post 
plurality No 11,651,239 $600 
Gabon 9.2 republic; multiparty 
presidential regime 
(opposition parties 
legalized in 1990)  
two-round 
system 
majority No 1,321,560 $6,500 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
9.1 Republic  party list proportional No 175,883 $1,200 
Ghana 9 Constitutional 
democracy  
first-past-the-
post 
plurality No 20,467,747 $2,000 
Cameroon 8.9 unitary republic; 
multiparty 
presidential regime 
(opposition parties 
legalized in 1990) 
parallel: first-
past-the-post 
semi-
proportional 
No 15,746,179 $1,700 
Congo 0 Rep. 8.5 Republic  two-round 
system 
majority No 2,954,258 $900 
Cote d'Ivoire 8.5 republic; multiparty 
presidential regime 
established 1960  
first-past-the-
post-block 
plurality No 16,962,491 $1,400 
Ethiopia 7.7 federal republic  first-past-the-
post 
plurality No 66,557,553 $700 
Togo 7.4 Republic under 
transition to 
multiparty 
democratic rule  
two-round 
system 
majority No 5,429,299 $1,400 
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Country % 
Women 
in Parl 
Government 
Type 
Electoral 
System 
System 
Type 
Gender 
Quotas 
Pop^n GDP 
per 
Capita
Benin 7.2 Republic under 
multiparty 
democratic rule 
party list proportional No 7,041,490 $1,100 
Kenya 7.1 Republic   first-past-the-
post 
plurality 6 of 12 
Presidential 
Seats 
Women - 
Party Quota 
DP 30%  
31,639,091 $700 
Nigeria 6.7 Republic in 
transition from 
military to civilian 
rule  
first-past-the-
post 
plurality No 133,881,703 $900 
Chad 5.8 Republic  two-round 
system 
majority No 9,253,493 $1,000 
Mauritius 5.7 parliamentary 
democracy  
block plurality No 1,210,447 $10,100 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
5 Republic  party list proportional Party Quota 
- CPDS no 
figure 
available 
510,473 $2,700 
Mauritania 3.7 republic  two-round 
system 
majority No 2,912,584 $1,700 
Niger 1.2 republic  parallel: first-
past-the-post 
semi-
proportional 
MNSD - 5 
seats 
reserved  
11,058,590 $800 
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Appendix One 
 
Cameroon – Various aid flows plotted against the percentage of women in parliament 1990-2002 
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Cameroon - Aid Types Combined (Government & Admin, Election, Women in 
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 Ghana – Various aid flows plotted against the percentage of women in parliament 1990-2002 
Ghana - Total Aid to Women in Parliament
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Kenya – Various aid flows plotted against the percentage of women in parliament 1990-2002 
Kenya - Total Aid to Women in Parliament
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South Africa – Various aid flows plotted against the percentage of women in parliament 1990-2002 
South Africa - Total Aid to Women in Parliament
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South Africa - Aid Types Combined (Government & Admin, Election, Women 
in Development) to Women in Parliament
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Namibia – Various aid flows plotted against the percentage of women in parliament 1990-2002 
Namibia - Total Aid to Women in Parliament
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Mozambique – Various aid flows plotted against the percentage of women in parliament 1990-2002 
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